By Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
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Additional resources for Access Pricing in Telecommunications
C 3. In order to maintain the correct relative levels of the final prices. Source: OECD. As mentioned earlier, in most cases, the total revenue of the monopolist must exceed the level that would result from marginal cost pricing. Applying principle 3 above gives the correct mark-up of final and access prices over marginal cost. In particular, access prices should be increased above marginal cost by an amount given by the Ramsey formula. This formula takes into account substitution effects between services and, in particular, between final services and access services.
In other words, the regulated firm must be able to trace to whom (or when or where) the corresponding final service is sold. This might not always be possible. We discuss further below the implications of the inability to price discriminate effectively at the access level. Is there a danger that the use of two-part prices at the access level will restrict competition downstream? After all, don’t two-part access prices introduce a form of increasing returns to scale downstream limiting the number of firms that can survive – perhaps even creating a downstream monopoly?
Price discrimination in access prices and final prices The following examples are intended to highlight the problems that might arise when price discrimination occurs in final prices but not in access prices. Example 1: Suppose that a telecommunications company charges a monthly fee for telephone service that depends on the class of customer. Suppose that there are two classes of customers – “residential” customers who pay $80 per month and “business” customers who pay $120 per month. The cost of providing local loops to each of these customers is $100.